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Abstract
The proposed market-risk capital-adequacy framework, to be implemented at the
end of 1997, requires Australian banks to hold capital against market risk. A
fundamental component of this framework is the opportunity for banks to use their
value-at-risk (VaR) models as the basis of the market-risk capital charge.
Value-at-risk measures the potential loss on a portfolio for a specified level of
confidence if adverse movements in market prices were to occur. This paper
examines the VaR measure and some of the techniques available for assessing the
performance of a VaR model.
The first section of the paper uses a simple portfolio of two spot foreign exchange
positions to illustrate three of the approaches used in the calculation of a VaR
measure: variance-covariance, historical simulation and Monte-Carlo simulation. It
is concluded that, although VaR is a very useful tool, it is not without its
shortcomings and so should be supplemented with other risk-management
techniques.
The second section of the paper focuses on the use of backtesting – the comparison
of model-generated VaR numbers with actual profits and losses z– for assessing the
accuracy of a VaR model. Several statistical tests are demonstrated by testing daily
VaR and profit and loss data obtained from an Australian bank. The paper
concludes that, although the tests are not sufficiently precise to form the basis of
regulatory treatment of banks’ VaR results, the tests do provide useful diagnostic
information for evaluating model performance.
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1. Introduction
At the beginning of 1998 the capital-adequacy standards applying to Australian
banks will be amended and banks will be required to hold capital against market as
well as credit risk. Market risk is the risk that changes in the market prices of
financial assets will adversely affect the value of a bank’s portfolios. An important
component of the proposed capital-adequacy arrangements is the opportunity for
banks to use their internal value-at-risk (VaR) models, as opposed to standard
regulatory formulae, as a basis for the capital calculation.
VaR is a measure of potential loss, where the potential loss is linked directly to the
probability of occurrence of large adverse movements in market prices. The first
part of this paper outlines the VaR measure and three different methods that are
used in calculating it: the variance-covariance, historical-simulation and
Monte-Carlo simulation methods.
The practical implementation of VaR models differs widely across banks. If banks
are permitted to use their internally developed methodologies as a basis for
regulatory capital requirements, regulators need to be satisfied as to the level of risk
coverage and accuracy of those models. Hence, the testing of VaR model
performance is a fundamental part of the proposed capital standards.
The second part of the paper discusses a number of tests that can be used to
evaluate the performance of a VaR model. Since these tests focus on the past
performance of a VaR model such testing is commonly referred to as backtesting.
Backtesting assesses the relationship between the estimates of potential loss
provided by a VaR model and the actual profits and losses realised by a bank’s
traders. The backtests are illustrated by applying the tests to VaR and profit and loss
data collected from an Australian bank.2
2. Value-at-risk
Internationally the use of VaR techniques has spread rapidly. This section defines
the VaR measure and discusses its use within the Australian banking industry. We
then discuss the three methods most commonly used to calculate a VaR estimate –
the variance-covariance approach, the historical-simulation approach and the
Monte-Carlo simulation approach.
In addition to its inclusion in the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision’s
guidelines for market risk capital adequacy,1 a number of other official bodies and
industry groups have recognised VaR as an important market-risk measurement
tool. For example, the ‘Fisher Report’ (Euro-currency Standing Committee 1994)
issued by the Bank for International Settlements in September 1994 made
recommendations concerning the disclosure of market risk by financial
intermediaries and advocated the disclosure of VaR numbers in financial
institutions’ published annual reports. Moreover, private-sector organisations such
as the Group of Thirty (1993) (an international group of bankers and other
derivatives market participants) have recommended the use of VaR methodologies
when setting out best-practice risk-management standards for financial institutions.
VaR is one of the most widely used market risk-measurement techniques by banks,
other financial institutions and, increasingly, corporates. Of the banks visited by the
Reserve Bank’s Market-Risk On-Site review team as at end October 1997, more
than half had some form of VaR calculation in place.
The application of VaR techniques is usually limited to assessing the risks being run
in banks’ treasury or trading operations (such as securities, foreign exchange and
equities trading). It is rarely only applied to the measurement of the exposure to the
interest-rate and foreign-exchange risks that arise from more traditional non-traded
banking business (for example, lending and deposit taking). Use of VaR by
Australian banks ranges from a fully integrated approach (where VaR is central to
the measurement and internal reporting of traded market risk and VaR-based limits
are set for each individual trader) to an approach where reliance is placed on other
techniques and VaR is calculated only for the information of senior management or
annual reporting requirements. At this stage, it is most common to see VaR used to
                                        
1 Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (1996a, 1996b).3
aggregate exposures arising from different areas of a bank’s trading activities while
individual traders manage risk based on simpler, market-specific risk measures.
2.1 Defining Value-at-risk
Value-at-risk aims to measure the potential loss on a portfolio that would result if
relatively large adverse price movements were to occur.2 Hence, at its simplest,
VaR requires the revaluation of a portfolio using a set of given price shifts.
Statistical techniques are used to select the size of those price shifts.
To quantify potential loss (and the severity of the adverse price move to be used)
two underlying parameters must be specified – the holding period under
consideration and the desired statistical confidence interval. The holding period
refers to the time frame over which changes in portfolio value are measured – is the
bank concerned with the potential to lose money over, say, one day, one week or
one year. For example, a VaR measure based on a one-day holding period reflects
the impact of daily price movements on a portfolio. It is assumed that the portfolio is
held constant over the holding period. The Basle Committee’s standards require that
banks use a ten-day holding period – thus requiring banks to apply ten-day price
movements to their portfolios. The confidence level defines the proportion of trading
losses that are covered by the VaR amount. For example, if a bank calculates its
VaR assuming a one-day holding period and a 99 per cent confidence interval then
it is to be expected that, on average, trading losses will exceed the VaR figure on
one occasion in one hundred trading days.
Thus, VaR is the dollar amount that portfolio losses are not expected to exceed,
with a specified degree of statistical confidence, over a pre-specified period of time.
2.2 An Example Portfolio
A simple portfolio of two spot foreign-exchange positions can be used to illustrate
and compare three of the most common approaches to the calculation of VaR. In the
following examples, a one-day holding period is assumed and VaR is defined in
terms of both 95
th and 99
th percentile confidence levels.
                                        
2 Value-at-risk may also be termed earnings-at-risk or a potential loss amount.4
The example portfolio consists of a spot long position in Japanese Yen and a spot
short position in US dollars (Table 1). Thus the value of the portfolio will be
affected by movements in the JPY/AUD and USD/AUD exchange rates.
Table 1: Portfolio of Two Positions
Position 1 100 000 JPY long
Position 2 -10 000 USD short
Estimation of a VaR figure is based on the historical behaviour of those market
prices that affect the value of the portfolio. In line with the Basle Committee’s
requirements we use 250 days of historical data, from 9 June 1995 to 5 June 1996,
to perform the VaR calculations below.
Figures 1 and 2 are histograms of the daily returns for the JPY/AUD and USD/AUD
exchange rates. The smooth line in each chart represents a normal distribution with
the same mean and standard deviation as the data. In both the upper and lower tails
of each series, the actual frequency of returns is greater than that which would be
expected if returns were normally distributed (that is, the observed distributions of
daily returns have ‘fatter tails’ than implied by the normal distribution). Thus both
series of daily returns appear more likely to be samples drawn from some
distribution other than a normal distribution (such as a t-distribution). The
implications of this result for the calculation of a VaR number will be considered
later in this paper.
The starting point of all three VaR approaches is to revalue the portfolio at current
market prices. Table 2 shows the revalued portfolio given the foreign exchange rates
on 5 June 1996.5

















































































-2.50 -1.87 -1.25 -0.62 0.00 0.86 3.44 2.58 1.726
Table 2: Portfolio Value as at 5 June 1996
Spot FX rate Position value AUD equivalent
Position 1 JPY/AUD 86.46 100 000 JPY 1 156.60 (100 000/86.46)
Position 2 USD/AUD 0.7943 -10 000 USD -12 589.70 (-10 000/0.7943)
2.3 The Variance-covariance Approach
In terms of the computation required, the variance-covariance method is the simplest
of the VaR approaches. For this reason, it is often used by globally active banks
which need to aggregate data from a large number of trading sites.
Variance-covariance VaR was the first of the VaR approaches to be offered in
off-the-shelf computer packages and hence, is also widely used by banks with
comparatively low levels of trading activity.
The variance-covariance approach is based on the assumption that financial-asset
returns and hence, portfolio profits and losses are normally distributed. The
consequence of these two assumptions is that VaR can be expressed as a function
of:
•  the variance-covariance matrix for market-price returns; and
•  the sensitivity of the portfolio to price shifts.
The first stage of the variance-covariance approach requires the calculation of a
variance-covariance matrix using the 250 days of historical data for the two series of
daily exchange rate returns. The variance-covariance matrix for this example is
expressed as:
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2 is the variance of the series of daily returns for JPY/AUD, sUSD
2 is
the variance of the series of daily returns for USD/AUD and  sJPY USD .  is the
covariance between the two series.
The second step in this approach is to calculate the market price sensitivities or
deltas of the portfolio; that is, the amounts by which the portfolio’s value will
change if each of the underlying market prices change by some pre-specified
amount. To do this, movements in each of the market prices which affect the value
of the portfolio are examined separately. Table 3 shows the change in the portfolio
given a 1 per cent move in each of the spot FX rates.
Table 3: Methodology for Calculating the Delta of Each Position
in the Portfolio
Current Revalued (assuming a 1% increase in AUD)
FX rates
JPY/AUD 86.46 87.32 (1.01 x 86.46)
USD/AUD 0.7943 0.8022 (1.01 x 0.7943)
Portfolio value (AUD)
Position 1 1 156.61 1 145.15 (100 000 / 87.32)
Position 2 -12 589.70 -12 465.05 (-10 000 / 0.8022)
Change in portfolio value or delta (AUD)
Position 1 -11.45
Position 2 124.65
The third step in this approach is to calculate the standard deviation or volatility of
total changes in portfolio value. Since total portfolio changes are assumed to be
normally distributed, the volatility of portfolio changes can be expressed as a
function of the deltas, the standard deviations of the two market-factor returns and
the covariance between them. Let d be the vector of market-price sensitivities or
deltas. If the standard deviation of portfolio changes is  v and the variance-
covariance matrix of the market prices is M then v is expressed as:
v = d d 'M8
In this example v is given by:






























The standard deviation of changes in the portfolio’s total value is 46 AUD.
To establish the VaR number of the portfolio for a given level of confidence the
standard deviation must be multiplied by the relevant scaling factor, which is
derived from the standard normal distribution. For example, if a 99 per cent level of
confidence is desired the appropriate scaling factor is 2.33 since the probability of
occurrence of a number less than -2.33 is 1 per cent. Scaling the standard deviation
of the portfolio by this amount yields a VaR number which should only be exceeded
1 per cent of the time. Note that the choice of a 99 per cent confidence level and
associated scaling factor of 2.33 assumes a one-tailed test in line with the Basle
market risk requirements (that is, only large losses are considered, not large profits).
Table 4 shows the VaR amounts, given 95 and 99 per cent levels of confidence, for
the example portfolio. Clearly the higher the level of confidence, the larger the VaR
number will be: given the various assumptions there is a 5 per cent probability that
the loss on the portfolio will exceed 76 AUD and only a 1 per cent probability that
the loss on the portfolio will be larger than 108 AUD.
Table 4: Value-at-risk using the Variance-covariance Approach
Confidence level Scaling factor Value-at-risk number
95 per cent 1.645 76.02 AUD (46.21x1.645)
99 per cent 2.330 107.67 AUD (46.21x2.33)
2.4 The Historical-simulation Approach
The historical-simulation method is more computationally intensive than the
variance-covariance approach and its use emerged within the Australian banking
industry a little later. While only three banks have been using historical simulation
for some time, the development of historical databases of market prices, together9
with more powerful (and less expensive) computer technology, has led several other
banks to move towards the use of this approach.
The historical-simulation approach also uses historical data on daily returns to
establish a VaR number, however, it makes no assumptions about the statistical
distribution of these returns. The first step in this approach is to apply each of the
past 250 pairs of daily exchange rate movements to the portfolio to determine the
series of daily changes in portfolio value that would have been realised had the
current portfolio been held unchanged throughout those 250 trading days.
To determine the revalued portfolio value two approaches can be used. The simpler
approach requires the previously calculated delta amount for each position to be
multiplied by each of the past changes in the relevant exchange rate. Recall that
delta measures how much the position value will change if the exchange rate
changes by 1 per cent. If the past actual change in the exchange rate is, say, 0.16 per
cent then the portfolio value will change by 0.16 · delta. The second, more arduous
approach is to revalue each position in the portfolio at each of the past exchange
rates. For linear positions (that is, positions the values of which change linearly with
changes in the underlying market prices) the two approaches will yield the same
result. However, for non-linear positions, such as positions in complex options, the
first approach may substantially under or overestimate the change in the value of the
position and thus may not generate an accurate measure of market risk exposure.
The second step is to sort the 250 changes in portfolio value in ascending order to
arrive at an observed distribution of changes in portfolio value. The histogram of
these changes is shown in Figure 3. The VaR number will be equal to that percentile
associated with the specified level of confidence. For a 95 per cent level of
confidence, the VaR number is 68.17 AUD and equals the 5
th percentile of the
distribution of changes in portfolio value. The k
th percentile means that the lowest
k per cent of the sample of changes in portfolio value will exceed the VaR measure.
Since there are 250 observations, essentially this means that 12.5 losses (or 5 per
cent of the sample) will be larger than the VaR measure (the VaR measure is
essentially the 13.5 lowest observation). Similarly, for a 99 per cent level of
confidence the VaR number is 102.11 and equals the first percentile. These results
are summarised in Table 5.10
Figure 3: Histogram of Changes in Portfolio Value
Relative frequency











Change in portfolio value (AUD)
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Table 5: Value-at-risk Using the Historical-simulation Approach
Confidence level Value-at-risk number
95 per cent 68.17  AUD
99 per cent 102.11  AUD
2.5 Monte-Carlo Simulation
This method is not widely used by Australian banks. Monte-Carlo techniques are
extremely computer intensive and the additional information that these techniques
provide is of most use for the analysis of complex options portfolios. To date, use of
Monte-Carlo simulation has been limited principally to the most sophisticated banks
and securities houses operating in the US. The Monte-Carlo method is based on the
generation, or simulation, of a large number of possible future price changes that
could affect the value of the portfolio. The resulting changes in portfolio value are
then analysed to arrive at a single VaR number.11
Briefly, the method requires the following steps.
1.  A statistical model of the market factor returns must be selected and the
parameters of that model need to be estimated. For the purposes of our
example, it is assumed that the two exchange-rate returns are drawn from a
bivariate t-distribution with 5 degrees of freedom and a correlation of 0.63.3 A
t-distribution was chosen as it is able to capture the fat-tails characteristic
observed in the data.
2.  A large number of random draws from the estimated statistical model are
simulated. This is done using a sampling methodology called Monte-Carlo
simulation in which a mathematical formula is used to generate series of
‘pseudo-random’ numbers to simulate the market factors. In this example, the
two exchange rates are simulated 50 000 times.
3.  The portfolio is revalued for each pair of simulated exchange rates and the
changes in portfolio value between the current value and these revalued
amounts are then determined. Figure 4 shows the histogram of these changes.
In the same way as in the historical simulation approach, these changes in portfolio
value are sorted in ascending order and the VaR number at a k per cent level of
confidence is determined as the (100-k) percentile of these sorted changes. The
resulting VaR measures are shown in Table 6.
                                        
3 Maximum likelihood estimation of the degrees of freedom for a univariate t-distribution for
each of the exchange rate returns series yielded an estimate of 5 degrees of freedom for both
the USD/AUD and the JPY/AUD rates.12
Figure 4: Distributing of the Changes in Portfolio Value Given the
Simulated Exchange Rate Levels
Relative frequency
















Simulated changes in portfolio value (AUD)
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Table 6: Value-at-risk using the Monte-Carlo Simulation Approach
Confidence level Value-at-risk number
95 per cent 157.96 AUD
99 per cent 356.10 AUD
The Monte-Carlo process permits analysis of the impact of events that were not in
fact observed over the historical period but that are just as likely to occur as events
that were observed. It is this capacity to evaluate likely events that have not
occurred that is one of the main attractions of this approach.
2.6 A Comparison of the Three Methods
The VaR numbers derived from the three approaches produce a wide range of
results (Table 7). In this example, the historical simulation method which takes into
account the actual shape of the observed distribution of profits and losses (shown in13
Figure 3) yields the lowest risk estimates. The variance-covariance method’s
assumption of symmetry around a zero mean gives equal weight to both profits and
losses, resulting in VaR estimates which are slightly higher than those of the
historical simulation approach. The simulation of a bivariate t-distribution results in
VaR estimates which are much larger than the estimates given by the other
two methods. A t-distribution with the same mean and variance as a normal
distribution will have a greater proportion of its probability mass in the tails of the
distribution (in fact, in this case, the t-distribution also has longer tails than the
empirical distribution). The prime focus of a VaR model is the probability of tail
events, hence, the long tails of the t-distribution have a disproportionate effect on
the VaR estimate. It can be seen that this effect becomes more marked the higher
the confidence level. It should be noted that this ranking of results from the
three methods is dependent on the data and also the statistical distribution used
within the Monte-Carlo simulation technique. Other price series exhibiting different
mean, skew and tail characteristics may result in the relative sizes of the three
methods’ VaR estimates being quite different.
Table 7: Summary of VaR Results
95 per cent 99 per cent
Variance-covariance 76.02 AUD 107.67 AUD
Historical-simulation 68.17 AUD 102.11 AUD
Monte-Carlo simulation 157.96 AUD 356.10 AUD
2.7 Advantages and Shortcomings of VaR
While VaR is used by numerous financial institutions it is not without its
shortcomings. First, the VaR estimate is based solely on historical data. To the
extent that the past may not be a good predictor of the future, the VaR measure may
under or overestimate risk. There is a continuing debate within the financial
community as to whether the correlations between different financial prices are
sufficiently stable to be relied upon when quantifying risk. There is also debate as to
how best to model the behaviour of volatility in market prices. Nevertheless, if an
institution wishes to avoid relying on subjective judgments regarding likely future
financial market volatility, reliance on history is necessary.14
Second, a VaR figure provides no indication of the magnitude of losses that may
result if prices move by an amount which is more adverse than that amount dictated
by the chosen confidence level. For example, the dollar VaR provides no insight
into what would happen to a bank if a 1 in 10 000 chance event occurred. To
address the risks associated with such large price shifts, banks are developing, and
bank supervisors are requiring, more subjective approaches such as stress testing to
be adopted in addition to the statistically based VaR approach. Stress testing
involves the specification of stress scenarios (for example, the suspension of the
European exchange rate mechanism) and analysis of how banks’ portfolios would
behave under such scenarios.
Third, the comparative simplicity of a VaR calculation where exposures in a wide
array of instruments and markets can be condensed into a single figure is both a
strength and a weakness. This simplicity has been the key to the popularity of VaR,
particularly as a means of providing summary information to a bank’s senior
management. The difficulty with this though, is that such a highly aggregate figure
may mask imbalances in risk exposure across markets or individual traders.
One of the chief advantages of the VaR approach is that it assesses exposure to
different markets (interest rates, foreign exchange, etc) in terms of a common base –
losses relative to a standard unit of likelihood. Hence, risks across different
instruments, traders and markets can be readily compared and aggregated. In
addition, a dollar-value VaR can be directly compared to actual trading profit and
loss results – both as a means of testing the adequacy of the VaR model and to
assess risk-adjusted performance. Risk-adjusted returns can be quantified simply by
looking at the ratio of realised profits/losses to VaR exposure. Such calculations
provide a basis for a bank to develop sophisticated capital-allocation models and to
renumerate individual traders not just for the volume of trading done, but to reflect
the riskiness of each trader’s activities.
3. Backtesting
As the previous discussion has demonstrated, there is a range of methods in use for
calculating VaR estimates. In practice, even where banks use the same broad
methods to calculate VaR, there is considerable variation in the application of those
VaR methodologies – different models may be used to measure the sensitivities of15
particular instruments to price movements (particularly for options and other more
complex products; see, for example, Cooper and Weston (1995)); different methods
may be used to aggregate exposures across instruments; and different techniques for
estimating price volatilities may be used.
Since there is such a divergence in the VaR methodologies and their application
across banks, and given the debate about the veracity of the statistical assumptions
underlying VaR calculations, it is useful to test the performance of VaR models.
Such testing is often referred to as ‘backtesting’.
Many banks that use VaR models routinely perform simple comparisons of daily
profits and losses with model-generated risk measures to gauge the accuracy of their
risk measurement systems. However, banks themselves are only just beginning to
develop more sophisticated backtesting techniques and there are considerable
differences in the types of tests performed.
In this paper we consider the following tests of VaR model performance:
•  the regulatory backtest required as part of the capital-adequacy framework;
•  exceptions testing which examines the frequency with which losses greater
than the VaR estimate are observed;
•  variance testing which compares the estimate of profit and loss variance
implicit in a VaR estimate with the realised variability of profits and losses
over time;
•  tests to assess whether the profit and loss data are normally distributed; and
•  a risk-tracking test evaluating the correlation between VaR estimates and the
magnitude of daily profit and loss results.
To illustrate these tests we apply each of the tests to VaR and profit and loss data
for a number of individual trading portfolios obtained from an Australian bank.16
3.1 Shortcomings of Backtesting
Before presenting the tests themselves we note that there are a number of difficulties
with the general approach to backtesting which uses realised profit and loss results.
The most fundamental of these arises from the fact that such backtesting attempts to
compare static portfolio risk with a more dynamic revenue flow. VaR is measured
as the potential change in value of a static portfolio, at a specific point in time
(typically end-of-day). Hence, the VaR calculation assumes that there is no change
in the portfolio during the holding period; the portfolio can be viewed as
representing a stock of risk at a given point in time. In practice, banks’ portfolios
are rarely static, but change frequently. Profits and losses are flows accruing over
time as a bank takes on and closes out positions reflecting changes in portfolio
composition during the holding period.
The difficulties that dynamic portfolios create can be illustrated most starkly by
considering a trading desk that is not permitted to hold open positions overnight.
During the day the desk may take positions and as a result experience large swings
in profit and loss, but at the end of each day all positions must be closed out. Hence,
an end-of-day VaR will always report a zero risk estimate, implying zero profit and
loss volatility, regardless of the positions taken on during the day. More generally,
where open positions remain at the end of the trading day, intra-day trading will
tend to increase the volatility of trading outcomes, and may result in VaR figures
underestimating the true risk embedded in any given portfolio.
To overcome this problem of dynamic portfolios, a backtest could be based on a
comparison of VaR (using a one-day holding period) against the hypothetical
changes in portfolio value that would occur if end-of-day positions were to remain
unchanged. That is, instead of looking at the current day’s actual profit or loss, the
profit or loss obtained from applying the day’s price movements to the previous
day’s end-of-day portfolio is calculated (this is often referred to as ‘close-to-close’
profit and loss). This hypothetical profit or loss result could then be compared to the
VaR based on the same, static, end-of-day portfolio. In such a case, the risk
estimate and the profit and loss would directly correspond. At this stage, several
Australian banks do perform analysis on this basis.
The distortion in backtesting comparisons arising from changes in portfolio
composition can be minimised by selecting a shorter holding period. Clearly17
movements in portfolio composition will be greater the longer the chosen holding
period. It is for this reason that the Basle Committee recommends that backtesting
be conducted based on a one-day holding period even though the capital that a bank
is required to hold against its market risk is based on a VaR with a ten-day holding
period (Basle Committee on Banking Supervision 1996a).
Further difficulties in conducting backtests arise because the realised profit and loss
figures produced by banks typically include fee income and other income not
attributable to position taking. While identification of fee income is relatively
straightforward, isolating profits generated solely from position taking may be more
difficult. Acting as a market maker allows banks to earn profits by setting different
bid and offer rates; even transactions conducted with a view to profiting from
market movements may profit from the bid/offer spread. A more sophisticated
approach to measuring profitability would involve a detailed attribution of income
by source, including fees, spreads, market movements and intra-day trading results.
In such a case, the VaR results should be compared with the income generated by
market movements alone. While most Australian banks do separate fee income from
trading profit and loss, more refined attribution of income focusing on isolating
revenue derived from position taking is generally only done in limited cases (for
example, where proprietary trading is conducted by traders separate from those
involved in other trading activity).
It may be argued that fee income and other market-making income are an inherent
part of a bank’s business and hence, their variability should be taken into account
when assessing the riskiness of the bank’s trading operations and when evaluating
the performance of risk-measurement techniques. However, the VaR models in use
at most banks are designed to measure outright position risk rather than risk arising
from volatility in fee income or from movements in bid/offer spreads which may
require the use of other modelling techniques. Thus the objective of backtesting
should be to compare measured position taking risk with pure position taking
revenue.
It should be kept in mind that shortcomings in the construction and practical
implementation of a VaR model may not be the only reason why models fail
backtests. As discussed in Section 2.7, VaR models do have some fundamental
shortcomings. A VaR model is reliant on historical data and cannot capture major
regime shifts in markets. Large swings in intra-day trading or an unusual event in18
trading income other than from position changes can lead to poor outcomes not
reflective of the quality of the VaR model’s construction.
3.2 The Sample Portfolios
The following sections step away from the data issues discussed above and look at
some of the tests currently in use in banks in Australia and overseas. Those tests are
applied to daily VaR and realised profit and loss data obtained from an Australian
bank; the data cover the period from January 1992 to February 1995. The bank uses
the variance-covariance approach to calculate a one-day holding period VaR.
The daily VaR figures were obtained from the daily market risk reports produced by
the bank. The reports detail both the bank’s total VaR amount and the VaR for
individual portfolios (spot foreign exchange (portfolio A), government securities
(portfolio B), money market instruments (portfolio C), interest-rate swaps (portfolio
D) and interest-rate options (portfolio E)). The testing here assesses VaR model
performance at the individual portfolio level. Similarly, profit and loss results were
obtained from the bank’s internal management report detailing the profit
performance of each portfolio. Actual, rather than hypothetical, profit and loss
figures have been used. Hence, the profit and loss numbers include some fee income
and other income not due to position taking. The daily VaR and profit and loss
results for each portfolio are shown in Figure 5. The black lines depict daily profit
and loss while the grey lines depict VaR results. Days where the actual loss
exceeded the VaR estimate are highlighted.19




























































































































































3.3 The Regulatory Backtest
Backtesting is a fundamental part of the market risk capital standards currently
being put in place by supervisors around the world. Under the capital adequacy
arrangements proposed by the Basle Committee, each bank must meet a capital
requirement expressed as the higher of: (i) an average of the daily VaR measures on
each of the preceding sixty trading days, adjusted by a multiplication factor; and (ii)
the bank’s previous day’s VaR number. The multiplication factor is to be set within
a range of 3 to 4 depending on the supervisor’s assessment of the bank’s risk
management practices and on the results of a simple backtest (Basle Committee on
Banking Supervision 1996a).4
The multiplication factor is determined by the number of times losses exceed the
day’s VaR figure (termed ‘exceptions’) as set out in Table 8 (Basle Committee on
Banking Supervision 1996b). The minimum multiplication factor of 3 is in place to
                                        
4 The market risk capital adequacy arrangements to apply to Australian banks (Prudential
Statement No. C3) were released by the Reserve Bank in January 1997 and are broadly
consistent with the Basle Committee’s international standards.22
compensate for a number of errors that arise in model implementation: simplifying
assumptions, analytical approximations, small sample biases and numerical errors
will tend to reduce the true risk coverage of the model (Stahl 1997). The increase in
the multiplication factor is then designed to scale up the confidence level implied by
the observed number of exceptions to the 99 per cent confidence level desired by
regulators. In calculating the number of exceptions, banks will be required to
calculate VaR numbers using a one-day holding period, and to compare those VaR
numbers with realised profit and loss figures for the previous 250 trading days.




Green zone 4 or less 3.00
5 3.40
6 3.50
Yellow zone 7 3.65
8 3.75
9 3.85
Red zone 10 or more 4.00
A simple approach to exceptions-based backtesting would be to assume that the
selected data period provides a perfect indication of the long-run performance of the
model. For example, if a VaR model was supposed to produce 99
th percentile risk
estimates, observed exceptions on any more than 1 per cent of days could indicate
problems with the model. This is not realistic since with a finite number of daily
observations it is quite probable that the actual number of times that losses exceed
VaR estimates will differ from the percentage implied by the model’s confidence
interval, even when the model is in fact accurate. Hence, the Basle approach is to
allocate banks into three zones based on the number of exceptions observed over
250 trading days. A model which truly covers a 99 per cent confidence interval has
only a 5 per cent chance of producing more than four exceptions (yellow zone), and
only a 0.01 per cent chance of producing more than ten exceptions (red zone).23
Table 9 shows the number of regulatory exceptions and the scaling factor to be
applied to each portfolio based on the last 250 days’ data in the sample.5 The
regulatory backtest places two portfolios (D and E) in the yellow zone. Results in
this range are plausible for both accurate and inaccurate models, although it is more
likely that the model is inaccurate. Portfolio B is placed in the red zone which will,
under the capital-adequacy framework, lead to an automatic presumption that a
problem exists within the VaR model.
Table 9: Regulatory Testing







Kupiec (1995) presents a more sophisticated approach to the analysis of exceptions
based on the observation that a comparison between daily profit or loss outcomes
and the corresponding VaR measures gives rise to a binomial experiment. If the
actual trading loss exceeds the VaR estimate the result is recorded as a failure (or
‘exception’); conversely, if the actual loss is less than the expected loss (or if the
actual trading outcome is positive) the result is recorded as a success.
If it can be assumed that a bank’s daily VaR measures are independent, the binomial
outcomes represent a sequence of independent Bernoulli trials each with a
probability of failure equal to 1 minus the model’s specified level of confidence; for
example, if the level of confidence is 95 per cent the probability of failure on each
trial will be 5 per cent.6 Hence, testing the accuracy of the model is equivalent to a
                                        
5 For internal risk management purposes the bank does not use a 99 per cent confidence interval;
the Basle exceptions were calculated using VaR figures that had been rescaled to 99 per cent
confidence equivalent amounts. All subsequent testing is based on the bank’s own internal
confidence level.
6 In fact this is not a good assumption. The  Ljung-Box Q-test for serial correlation found
significant autocorrelation in the VaR series for all five portfolios.24
test of the null hypothesis that the probability of failure on each trial equals the
model’s specified probability. Kupiec uses two tests to examine this hypothesis –
the time between failures test and the proportion of failures test.
3.4.1 Time between failures test
The first test is based on the number of trading days between failures and is applied
each time a failure is observed. This test is most useful in the case where a risk
manager is monitoring the performance of a VaR model on a daily basis and
focusing on the new information provided by the model. For example, a bank’s risk
manager could consider reviewing the model if a number of exceptions occur in
succession. The test is less well suited to an analysis of long runs of ex post data on
model performance.
To explain the test in more detail we use the following notation:
v = the observed time (in days) between failures;
p = true probability covered by the VaR model;
p* = the probability specified by the VaR model being tested,
(100 - confidence interval)%; and
~ p = the maximum likelihood estimator of p, given by 1/ v in the test.
It can be shown that a likelihood ratio (LR) test is the most powerful for testing the




















The LR statistic is distributed as a chi square distribution with 1 degree of freedom.
This test is subject to a number of shortcomings. Firstly, the test has extremely poor
power. This means that the test may not reject a VaR model although it continually
underestimates risk. The problem is compounded by the fact that the power of the
time between failures test is lower, the lower is the probability value under the null
hypothesis. That is, for banks with higher stated confidence levels, the likelihood of25
not rejecting the VaR model, when it is in fact underestimating risk, increases.
Moreover, as the VaR model’s confidence level increases, the extent by which
potential loss is underestimated increases at an accelerating rate. For example, a
VaR model purporting to cover a probability of 0.005 but which is in fact generating
potential loss estimates consistent with a probability level of 0.025 will
underestimate risk by a greater amount than a model with a specified probability
level of 0.03 but which yields true coverage consistent with a 0.05 probability.
A second difficulty relates to the values of  v (the number of days between
successive failures) associated with the critical value of the LR statistic. The critical
value of the distribution, at a 5 per cent level of significance, is 3.841. For a model
which specifies a probability level of, say, 0.025 the LR statistic will exceed the
critical value (and so the VaR model will be rejected) when v is less than 12 or
greater than 878. For values of v less than 12, the test concludes that the model is
underestimating risk. Conversely, for values of v greater than 878 the model is likely
to be overestimating risk. From a supervisory perspective, the concern is on the
former of these alternatives. The problem arises when the specified probability level
is 0.05 or larger. In this case, the resulting LR statistic will be less than the critical
value for values of v of two or larger and will be undefined for v equal to one (when
two failures are observed on successive trading days). Hence, for these models there
exists no critical value for v at which the model will be rejected.
Table 10 summarises, for each portfolio, the results of the time between failures
test. The second column of the table reports the trading day on which the first failure
is observed and column three reveals whether or not the test would reject the model
after observing this first failure. Column four lists, for each portfolio, the number of
failures that were observed before the VaR model is rejected. Columns five and six
report the total number of failures observed over the sample period and the total
number of times the null hypothesis was rejected at a 5 per cent level of
significance.26
Table 10: Time between Failures Test
Portfolio First failure Test result Failures before
first rejection
Failures Rejections
A 4 reject 1 5 3
B 5 reject 1 27 17
C 203 do not reject – 3 0
D 28 do not reject 2 31 17
E 88 do not reject 4 36 24
The results in Table 10 imply that the model performs well for portfolios A and C
while portfolios B, D and E are identified as portfolios where the model does not
seem to be adequately capturing the potential for losses to be observed. There are a
number of occasions on which these three portfolios experience a run of rejections
on successive trading days or trading days two or three days apart. This result
suggests that the VaR model may not be able to cope with large movements in
market prices; it could be that the price volatilities within the VaR are not updated
with sufficient frequency to capture the time-varying nature of the profit and loss
variability (that is, autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity). It is noteworthy
that if this LR test was applied by a risk manager to performance data on a daily
basis this problem with the model would be detected quite early on in the sample
period.
3.4.2 Proportion of failures test
The second test is based on the proportion of failures observed over the entire
sample period. A test of the null hypothesis that the VaR model’s stated probability
level is equal to the realised probability level covered by the VaR model (p = p*) is
again best achieved using a LR test. The LR test statistic is given by:
LR
p p n x



















where n denotes the total number of outcomes in the sample period, x denotes a
Bernoulli random variable representing the total number of observed failures and  ~ p
is the maximum likelihood estimator, given by x/n (x ￿ 1).27
While this test is better suited to an analysis of ex post data than is the time between
failures test, it still has some problems. As was the case with the preceding test, the
proportion of failures test has poor power characteristics which become worse as
the confidence interval being tested increases. Further, although the power of the
test improves as the sample period increases, a substantial sample size is required
for the test to have significant power. Nonetheless, with the exception of the case of
a single failure for which the test is equivalent to the time between failures test, the
proportion of failures test has more power than the preceding test owing to its
making use of more information. Moreover, the LR statistic is defined for all
combinations of x and n (except x = n = 1) and so can be applied for all stated
probabilities.
Table 11 summarises the results of the proportion of failures test when applied to
each of the portfolios. As with the time between failures test, it can be concluded
that those portfolios whose models do not give rise to any failures over the period
are not rejected. For all portfolios the results of this test are consistent with the time
between failures test.
Table 11: Proportion of Failures Test
Portfolio x n Proportion of failures (%) Chi square Significance
A 5 653 0.8 0.8 0.372
B 27 673 4.0 66.0 0.000
C 3 669 0.4 0.0 0.847
D 31 631 4.9 87.2 0.000
E 36 692 5.2 105.1 0.000
3.5 Estimates of Variance
A VaR figure can be regarded simply as a rescaled variance. This is most
transparent in the variance-covariance calculation of VaR. Hence, it is possible to
undo a VaR calculation to obtain the profit and loss volatility underlying the VaR
calculation and to compare this against the observed variance of profits and losses.
The test below compares the volatility derived from the average VaR over time with
the variance of the actual profit and loss distribution over the same period.
Assuming that profits and losses are normally distributed (the validity of this
assumption is tested in the next section), an F test can be used to test whether the28
two variance estimates are significantly different. Under the null hypothesis that the
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where VaR  denotes the average VaR over time, k denotes the number of standard
deviations required for the specified confidence interval (for example, a
97.5 per cent confidence interval is equivalent to 1.96 standard deviations) and n
denotes the number of daily observations.
Table 12 which follows shows the observed standard deviation of profit and loss,
VaR k /  and the results of the F test for each portfolio. For all portfolios, except
portfolio D, the VaR variance is not significantly less than the profit and loss
variance suggesting that overall the VaR adequately captures true volatility.
Table 12: Variance Testing
Portfolio VaR k /  ($ 000) P&L Std Dev ($ 000) F Significance
A 417.3 152.9 0.134 1.000
B 123.9 110.0 0.788 0.999
C 229.6 92.2 0.161 1.000
D 118.1 172.4 2.129 0.000
E 113.1 101.2 0.800 0.998
3.6 Tests of Normality
Where it is the case that a bank uses a VaR methodology that assumes that financial
returns are normally distributed (such as the variance-covariance method), testing
whether the observed profits and losses follow a normal distribution can serve as
useful backtesting.
There is a wide variety of tests that may be used to test for normality. Two of the
simplest tests focus on the skewness and kurtosis of the observed distribution.29
Skewness measures the imbalance in a distribution, that is, whether observations
occur more frequently above or below the mean. The skewness of each profit and
loss series and the result of tests to determine whether the skewness is significantly
non-zero are presented in Table 13. Tests for the significance of the skewness
statistic are set out in Kendall and Stuart (1963).
In the opening section of this paper it was shown that large exchange rate
movements are observed more often than is consistent with the data being normally
distributed; that is, the empirical distributions for exchange rates have fatter tails
than the normal distribution. In fact, it has been observed that a large number of
financial series exhibit fat tails (see, for example, Bollerslev et al. (1994)). It is
possible to quantify the divergence between the tails of the observed and normal
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If v4 0 =  the tails on the distribution follow a normal distribution, if v4 is negative
the distribution has thinner tails than a normal distribution, while if  v4 is positive
the distribution has fatter tails (known as leptokurtosis). Again, tests for the
significance of the kurtosis statistic are given in Kendall and Stuart (1963).
Tests based on skewness and kurtosis each focus on one particular aspect of the
observed distribution. It is also possible to devise tests that take into account the
entire distribution by comparing the cumulative distribution functions of the
observed data and the normal distribution. As an example, Figure 6 shows the
observed cumulative distribution function for the profits and losses on portfolio A
compared with the standard normal cumulative distribution function. There are a
number of ways to quantify the difference between the two functions. One widely
used test is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test which takes as its test statistic the
maximum value of the absolute difference between the two functions (the distance
between points A and B in Figure 6).30



















One weakness with this test is that it places greater weight on observations around
the median. An alternative test which gives equal weight to all percentiles across the
distribution is the Kuiper test (Crnkovic and Drachman 1996). This test is based on
the statistic:
V S x N x N x S x
x x
= - + -
-¥< <¥ -¥< <¥
max [ ( ) ( )] max [ ( ) ( )]
where S(•) is the observed cumulative distribution function,  N(•) is the Normal
cumulative distribution function and  x denotes observations of profit and loss
results.7 That is, instead of looking at the largest distance between the functions, the
Kuiper statistic takes into account the sum of the maximum distance of S(x) above
N(x) and below N(x). Press et al. (1992) describe the procedures for testing the
significance of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Kuiper statistics.
                                        
7 An unbiased estimator of the cumulative distribution function of the probability distribution
from which the profit and loss figures are drawn, S(x), is given by the fraction (out of the total
number of observations) of data points that are less than x.31
The skewness and kurtosis statistics, along with tests of their significance, and the
results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) and Kuiper tests are presented in Table 13.
The results of the four tests are in agreement; the tests yield a consistent conclusion
for all five portfolios. All portfolios are found to be strongly non-normal. Since a
variance-covariance VaR model is used by the bank, the finding of non-normality
implies that the VaR measure will not correctly estimate the true risk exposure. In
particular, since the profit and loss distributions are quite fat-tailed, the VaR model
would be expected to significantly underestimate risk.
Table 13: Tests Of Normality
Portfolio Skew Significance Kurtosis Significance KS Significance Kuiper Significance
A -0.462 0.000 3.292 0.000 1.307 0.066 2.627 0.000
B 2.347 0.000 41.477 0.000 4.087 0.000 8.212 0.000
C -1.029 0.000 30.396 0.000 4.710 0.000 9.243 0.000
D 4.472 0.000 42.118 0.000 3.939 0.000 6.868 0.000
E -2.598 0.000 32.455 0.000 3.042 0.000 5.976 0.000
Total bank 0.983 0.000 7.939 0.000 1.705 0.006 3.142 0.000
Given that the bank’s profit and loss data does include fee income and other income
derived from the bid/offer spread that a market maker is able to obtain, some
negative skewness in the profit and loss distribution would be expected. In fact the
test results are quite mixed, with two of the five portfolios exhibiting positive
skewness. To the extent that there is positive skewness in the profit and loss
distribution, the variance-covariance VaR calculation will overestimate true risk,
offsetting any underestimation resulting from the failure to capture the leptokurtosis
(fat tails) of the distribution.
Given that individual portfolios may be quite non-normal, this could result in VaR
models that do assume normality significantly underestimating risk. It is at the
aggregate level (that is, the sum of individual portfolio’s profit and loss), however,
that regulatory tests will apply in the first instance. It is expected that non-normality
should be less evident at the aggregate level than for individual portfolios. This is
based on the central limit theorem which states that taking the sum of increasing
numbers of individual statistical processes will result in the distribution of the sum
tending towards normality regardless of the distribution of the individual32
components. In fact, as shown in Table 13, this effect does not seem to be very
strong. The total profit and loss for the bank remains strongly non-normal.
3.7 Risk Tracking
There are two dimensions to evaluating the performance of any risk measure – the
level of coverage provided and the efficiency of the measure. The tests in the
previous sections have focused on coverage – what level of losses would a
VaR-based capital charge insure against. A good risk measure needs to be more
than just appropriately conservative, it should also be strongly correlated with the
portfolio’s true risk exposure. A conservative but inefficient risk measure would
tend to overestimate risk in periods of low risk.
The very simplest test that can be performed is to assess the relationship between
the VaR estimates and the absolute value of each day’s profit or loss. In a very
simple sense, large VaR figures should be accompanied by large profits or losses
while small VaR estimates should be associated with small profit and loss results.
Consider a portfolio containing positions in a single asset: as the exposure to that
asset grows the variance of the profit and loss distribution will increase and the VaR
should increase to reflect the greater exposure (Figure 7). As the exposure increases,
larger profit and loss observations become more likely. To the extent that the VaR is
tracking the increased variance of the underlying profit and loss distribution, there
should be some correlation between the size of profits and losses and the VaR. This
effect may not be strong, however, as the bulk of the profit and loss observations
will be drawn from the centre of the distribution.
In the broadest terms, both VaR and profit and loss are a function of two processes
– changes in market prices and the composition of the bank’s portfolio. The bank
considered here uses a relatively long run of data to calculate historical price
volatilities and updates the price volatility history quarterly. The bank does not use a
time weighting scheme such as exponential weighting but rather assumes that the
covariance matrix is fixed independent of time. As a result, the bulk of the time
variation in the VaR figures comes from changes in the composition of the bank’s
portfolios.33









If the bank’s portfolios were constant (and assuming that the statistical process
driving market prices are unchanging through time), then the profit and loss
distributions would be constant through time. A perfectly efficient VaR, in such a
case, would also be constant. Hence, profit and loss magnitudes and VaR estimates
would be quite uncorrelated despite the fact that the VaR is perfectly efficient.
However, banks’ portfolios are not constant; as can be seen from Figure 5, the bank
considered here is an active trader whose portfolio composition and profit and loss
distribution change markedly from day to day.
Given that the assumption of normality of both the absolute value of profit and loss
and VaR is problematical, it is useful to consider tests which do not require any
assumption about the distribution of the two series. One such test is based on the
rank correlation coefficient. Let X denote the series of profit and loss magnitudes
and Y the VaR series. Ranks 1, 2, …, n are then assigned to the X’s and Y’s.
Let Ui = rank of Xi and Vi = rank of Yi then the rank correlation coefficient, R, is










. Tests of the significance of the relation between the two series can
be based on this.
The rank correlations for each portfolio are presented in Table 14. Overall, the tests
indicate that the VaR numbers are not strongly correlated with the magnitudes of the
profit and loss outcomes. While four of the five rank correlations are significantly
positive, the magnitude of the estimated correlations are small.
Table 14: Correlation between VaR and the Absolute Value of Profit and Loss







Despite their weaknesses, the tests employed in this paper provide some useful
diagnostics for evaluating VaR model performance. The exceptions-based testing
identifies portfolios B, D and E as areas where the VaR model is not adequately
covering realised losses. In the case of portfolio D, this assessment is supported by
the results of the variance-based test. These weaknesses in the VaR model can, to a
large extent, be attributed to the observed non-normality of profit and loss. Given
that the risk-tracking performance of the model is not strong, there does appear to
be considerable scope for the model to be further refined.
The use of VaR models has spread remarkably rapidly across the financial industry
over the past six or so years. As the techniques have become more widespread, the
range of methods for calculating VaR estimates has broadened. That said, the use of
VaR models are at comparatively early stages of development for many Australian
banks. The need for further refinement of newly developed models on the part of
banks, and the need for regulators to assess the performance of such models,
suggests that backtesting should play an important role in furthering the evolution of
VaR techniques.35
Given that our sample bank was just starting the process of implementing and
refining its VaR model at the time when the data were collected, it would be
expected that the model might not perform well. Over the past year, many banks
that use VaR measures as part of their risk-management process (including the
sample bank discussed here) have significantly upgraded their VaR model; for
example, by improving the quality of the historical price data underlying the
calculation, more accurately modelling the price sensitivities of individual
instruments or by moving from a variance-covariance approach to a Monte-Carlo
simulation approach. Hence, the test results shown here should not be taken as
describing the performance of Australian banks’ models more broadly.
The tests that have been applied in this paper are not sufficiently precise to form the
basis of regulatory treatment of banks’ VaR estimates in the way that the
Basle Committee defines its three zones. Notwithstanding their shortcomings, these
tests do appear to provide some useful information to both risk managers within
banks and bank supervisors. The tests may aid in identifying those portfolios where
VaR performs poorly, and may provide some insight into why a VaR model may not
capture the risks of particular portfolios well, thus guiding the process of improving
the analysis and modelling of trading risks.36
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